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Autonomy Here and Now
Cavell’s Criticisms of Rawls
Nadav Arviv
AUTHOR'S NOTE
This paper is inspired by, and substantially draws on, the work of Eli Friedlander and
Steven Affeldt. In their Doctoral dissertations they appropriate Cavell’s criticisms of
Rawls and incorporate other Cavellian themes in developing their respective, original
interpretations of Rousseau (Friedlander Eli, Expressions of Judgment, Harvard University
Dissertation (UMI), 1992 esp. chapter 3 “Before the Law,” 225-68; Affeldt Steven, 
Constituting Mutuality, Harvard University Dissertation (UMI), 1996 esp. chapter 1, “The
Citizen as Legislator,” 1-178). I thank Eli Friedlander in particular for showing me the way
to and around Cavell. I am also indebted to Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Lear, whose
insights into Kantian Ethics and its difficulties inform this paper to a great extent.
1 According to Christine Korsgaard, one very important merit of the constitutive move is that
it meets skeptical challenges “with ease.”1 She thinks Rawls enacts such a move:
And [The principles of Justice], Rawls might say, just are the principles of justice for
a liberal society. To see why, we need only compare the problem faced by a liberal
society with the content of Rawls’s two principles of justice. Echoing Rousseau, we
might  say  that  the  problem  faced  in  the  original  position  is  this:  to  find  a
conception of justice which enables every member of society to pursue his or her
conception of the good as effectively as possible while leaving each member as free
as he or she was before. The content of Rawls’s two principles simply reflects this
conception of the problem. So Rawls’s two principles simply describe what a liberal
society must do in order to be a liberal society... Rawls’s principles are derived from
the idea of liberalism itself... The normative force of the conception is established in
this way. If you recognize the problem to be real, to be yours, to be one you have to
solve, and the solution to be the only or the best one, then the solution is binding
upon you.2
2 The  constitutive  move  takes  on  the  challenge  of  a  practical  skeptic.  The  skeptic
undertakes a certain activity but rejects a guiding principle of that activity, a principle
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for  which  normative authority  is  claimed.  Supposedly,  upon  being  shown  that  the
principle is constitutive of the activity he undertakes, the skeptic is silenced. He now
cannot reject the suggested principle, because the principle is an internal condition of an
activity he himself undertakes.
3 The constitutive move is sometimes traced back to Rawls’s seminal paper “Two Concepts
of Rules.” Already with respect to that paper, Stanley Cavell offers a thought provoking
criticism that, while sympathetic to the general foundationalist thrust of the move, points
to  a  certain problematic.  The problematic  arises  when,  let  me say,  the mood of  the
constitutive move is carried into the metaethical task of understanding of the workings of
moral encounter.
4 This  paper  suggests  that,  and  spells  out  the  way  in  which,  this  early  criticism  is
essentially a precursor of a later more mature criticism Cavell launches against Rawls’s
conception, in TJ, of (what Cavell calls) The Conversation of Justice. Mature, because it is
informed  by,  and  put  to  the  service  of  Cavell’s  own  positive  contribution  to  moral
thinking, namely, Emersonian Moral Perfectionism. I hope that in relating the latter more
difficult, “Cavellian” criticism to the former more accessible, let us say, disciplined critical
stance, light will be shed on some prominent issues in Moral Perfectionism. Particularly,
the constitutive move is closely related to the notion of autonomy. For it is essential to
the move to show that the skeptic somehow identifies with the rules he, in this case, seeks
to reject. It will be a prominent task of this paper to show that the notion of autonomy
the move utilizes is not only unsuited for the description of the goings on in ordinary
moral judgment - unsuited to show how autonomy manifests in judging over and above
the  fact  that  the  judgment  accords  with  autonomous  rules  –  but  that  this  notion
encourages  a  conception  of  judging  whereby  a  place  for  autonomy  in  this  sense  is
precisely denied.
 
The Criticism of “Two Concepts of Rules”
5 In  “Two  Concepts  of  Rules”  Rawls  distinguishes  between  justifying  a  practice  and
justifying an action falling under it. He elaborates the distinction by showing how it helps
to  fend off  an eminent  objection3 to  utilitarianism.  The objection is  that  in  the end
utilitarianism cannot account for the obligation to keep a particular promise: applying
the utilitarian principle to decide whether one should keep or break a promise essentially
dissolves the binding of  the commitment made in promising,  and thereby offends our
intuitions about the kind of obligation making a promise is.
6 Rawls shows that once the logical distinction between justifying a practice and justifying
an action falling under it is in place, it is open to the utilitarian to contend that while the
utilitarian principle applies to the former, it does not, and indeed the very nature of the
practice at stake will not allow it to, apply to the latter. Thus anti-utilitarian arguments,
Rawls says, take it for granted that the promisor... is entitled without restriction to bring
utilitarian considerations to bear in deciding whether to keep his promise. But if  one
considers what the practice of promising is one will see, I think, that it is such as not to
allow this sort of general discretion to the promisor. Indeed, the point of the practice is to
abdicate one’s title to act in accordance with utilitarian and prudential considerations in
order that the future may be tied down and plans coordinated in advance. There are
obvious utilitarian ad- vantages in having a practice which denies the promisor,  as a
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defense,  any general appeal to the utilitarian principle in accordance with which the
practice itself may be justified.4
7 There  is  a  distinctive  kind  of  illegitimacy  involved  in  entertaining  utilitarian
considerations when deliberating the breaking of a particular promise, which is directly
related  to  what  Korsgaard  means  by  saying  that  constitutive  standards  help  meet
skeptical challenges “with ease.” By showing the skeptic, who challenges the rule of a
practice he nevertheless participates in, that the rule is constitutive of the practice, we
essentially obviate the room for so much the raising of the question. The constitutive
move remaps the alternatives in such a way that questioning the rules is not open to the
participant of  the practice.  It’s  a kind of  “my way or the highway”:  you cannot  both
participate in the practice and disobey its rules.  The skeptic realizes questioning the
authority  of  the  rules  trumps  responsibilities  he  had  already,  participating  in  the
practice, taken upon himself. He is thus more silenced than answered. For he is shown
not why he should, here and now, as it were get himself to obey the rule, but rather, why
he, in a sense, cannot but obey it, why, in a sense, it is not up to him whether he does or
not. How is it exactly that we achieve this in the case of promising? And what is the
skeptic’s ensuing silence like?
8 The nature of the illegitimacy involved in the appeal to the utilitarian principle to excuse
the breaking of a promise is better understood when we distinguish two kinds of rule:
Summary Rules and Practice Rules. Summary Rules essentially sum up or record in the
form of a rule a certain pattern of past decisions. Looking back, similarities in cases and
decisions are recognized, and based on past patterns rules are established to facilitate
decisions in the future. This means of course that the relevant cases and decisions are
describable independently of the rules. Since rules are but guides and aids for decisions
whose basis is independent of the rules, we can say that such decisions are “logically
prior”5 to the rules. Thus, one is always entitled to reconsider and overturn the rule’s
precept, and there is room to question the rule’s normative authority in a particular case,
or indeed, at all.
9 In contrast with that, Practice Rules “define a practice.”6 They thus are “logically prior”
to particular cases and decisions, since “there cannot be a particular case of an action
falling under the rule of a practice unless there is the practice.”7 The idea is that the
concept of a practice essentially involves people obeying or following the rules, calling it
the manifestation of a “capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws”:8
The rules cannot be taken as simply describing how those engaged in the practice
in fact behave: it is not simply that they act as if they were obeying the rules. Thus
it  is  essential  to the notion of a practice that the rules are publicly known and
understood as definitive; and it is essential also that the rules of a practice can be
taught and can be acted upon to yield a coherent practice.9
10 Whereas Summary Rules formulate a regularity the occurrence of which is in principle
independent  of  such  rules’  being  formulated,  the  formulation  and  dissemination  of
Practice Rules – i.e.,  there being a practice – is  responsible not just  to the observed
regularity of cases falling under these rules, but also to there being such a phenomenon
überhaupt, to the possibility there being such a thing as a case that falls under the rule of a
practice.
11 Compare: if I disturb your peace by playing loud music all hours of the night, and a law to
the contrary is in place, I may properly be said to be breaking the law. It is clear that
nothing in the description of the case hangs on the existence of such a law. Indeed, the
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common recurrence of such neighborly disputes might be thought to have induced the
relevant legislation, “bottom up” legislation, as it were. Furthermore, were someone’s
routine conduct to suddenly count, under a newly passed bill, as breaking the law, they
wouldn’t  by that be offending a constitutive standard of what they were doing:  they
would be doing the same thing as before, only now there is a law to the contrary. Now
consider the case of promising. Supposedly it is a law of the practice of promising that
you are not to appeal to the utilitarian principle to excuse the breaking of the promise. In
contrast to the former example, in this case you (logically) can’t break the law, since for
the case to be a case of breaking a promise, for your activity to so much as be described as
that of the breaking a promise, a practice of promising with its rules – rules defining,
among other things, forms of admissible excuses, forms of breaking a promise – must already be
in place. The logical priority of Practice Rules, the sense in which rules of a practice are
constitutive, means that were you to fail to act in accordance with them, you will simply
not count as participating in the practice.
12 We can therefore distinguish two categories of violation of rules: breaking a Summary
Rule is  perpetrating an action that  the law,  it  so happens,  forbids,  while  breaking a
Practice  Rule  amounts  to  failing  to  participate  in  the  activity  that  the  rule  (partly)
defines. What’s important here is a sense in which one cannot break the Practice Rules: in
so far as those rules are constitutive of the activity they define one either falls in or out:
either partaking in the activity so defined and thus abiding by the rules of the practice or
doing something different altogether. This is in line with the fact that our reaction to
someone’s actually appealing to the utilitarian principle to break a promise is one of
failing to understand (or “taking it as a joke”) rather than one of reproach or rebuke.
13 Stephen Mulhal has offered a review of Cavell's various criticisms of Rawls.10 It will help
my analysis of Cavell’s attitude towards the constitutive move to see what Mulhal thinks
the locus of Cavell’s criticism is. Here is what Mulhal says:
To think of human commitments to which human speech and action gives rise as
fixed by a system of defining rules insures that those commitments are limited in
advance,  and  limited  in  impersonal  ways;  to  think  of  human  relationships  as
exhaustively  determined  by  out  occupation  of  socially  defined  roles  limits  in
advance the range and depth of their claims upon us as persons. On Cavell's view,
the reality is that the reach of such commitments and relationships is always in the
course of being determined, and so must in fact be fixed by us. So Rawls’s vision of
the moral life effectively makes the self’s commitments and relationships less fluid
and more evident than they really are, and thereby conjures up a fantasy of a self
that is more fixed, more invulnerable and more transparent to itself than it really
is.11
14 I think it is important to see that the ‘de-rigidifying’ current Mulhal is pointing out, while
no doubt present, hinges on another criticism, a criticism directed at the constitutive move,
and whose consequence is, in a sense, the deepening of that move. It is important to see
that Cavell’s criticism proceeds in two stages: first, there is the suggestion that the depth
of the notion of the practice funding the constitutive move is not fully thought out, and
secondly, building on that first insight, that there is a failure on the side of Rawls to
properly register the form of moral discussions. I am insisting on slicing the criticism this
way for  at  least  one  important  reason.  Thinking  of  Cavell  as  ‘de-rigidifying’  Rawls’s
account might lead us to suppose that Cavell disagrees with Rawls about the shape and
content  of  our  commitments,  that  he  gives  a  picture of  their  nature  that  results  in
conceiving them as either more lax (say, that he is more tolerant) or more up to us (say,
that he is more relativistic) than Rawls does. I do not think that that is the case. In fact,
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Cavell iterates, in laying out his criticism, much sympathy with the constitutive move and
what  it  accomplishes,  and  in  the  later,  perfectionist,  criticism  he  never  tires  of
applauding Rawls’s accomplishment in giving a systematic account of the nature and
ground of justice (showing “the justice of justice,”12 as he puts it). Rather than replacing 
Rawls’s picture of the way we are bound by the nature of our practice, Cavell is interested
in, I would say, articulating the way in which the mode of philosophizing typical to such a
foundationalistic  enterprise  tends  to  overstep  its  bounds.  By  spelling  out  first  the
criticism that operates at the foundational level of the constitutive move, and then seeing
how this criticism links to the second criticism, the criticism about the nature of moral
conversation, I hope to come to a better grip of the nature of this overstepping of bounds.
But we will have to go into some detail first.
15 I said that Cavell is highly sympathetic to the constitutive move as it appears in Rawls’s
treatment of promising. It is his “complete agreement” with Rawls’s basic strategy of
defending the utilitarian which prompts Cavell to “articulate as well as [he] can” where
Rawls’s account falls short. Rawls’s own insight, so Cavell’s, that “it is part of the concept
of promising that one does not keep or break particular promises on general utilitarian
grounds” is stopped short by his failure to appreciate how fundamental the practice that
funds promising really is.13
16 Register,  for  starters,  Cavell’s  “concept  of  a  promise” instead of  Rawls’s  “practice  of
promising.”  Cavell  hones  in  on  the  following  from Rawls,  quoted  above:  “There  are
obvious  utilitarian  advantages  in  having  a  practice which  denies  the  promisor,  as  a
defense,  any general appeal to the utilitarian principle in accordance with which the
practice itself may be justified.” Cavell objects:
[I]t  must  be  wondered  whether  that  is,  literally,  a  comprehensible  statement...
Since there would be no promise apart from a knowledge of that fact about the
concept of promising (that one does not coherently keep or break them on general
utilitarian grounds) it is not comprehensible to justify actions falling under that
concept by appealing to such fact.14
17 Rawls  is  found unawares  of  just  how deep  the  notion of  practice  that  supports  the
constitutive move runs. For on top of suggesting that the distinction he draws helps the
utilitarian fend off the accusation that applying the utilitarian principle to a particular
case  offends  our  moral  sensibilities,  he  suggests  that  the  utilitarian  can  use  the
distinction to locate the place where the utilitarian principle may indeed be used, namely,
the justification of the practice as a whole. According to Cavell, however, in so far as one
thinks of promising as the kind of practice the rules of which are, in any ordinary sense,
justifiable one misses a fundamental aspect of the kind of practice it is. This is the aspect
that is registered by replacing “practice” with “concept”; it is an aspect that the earlier
chapters of The Claim of Reason,  following Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations,  are
interested to work out:
[Rawls] cannot mean merely what Wittgenstein means by referring to “obeying a
rule”  or  “making  a  report”  as  “institutions”  or  practices  (Investigations  § 199,
§ 202) […] [W]hat[Wittgenstein] means, roughly, is that there are ways of doing all
of these things, that not just anything you do will be competently performing them,
that, in a word, they have a grammar, and in that sense are conventional, and in
that sense social. He does not... mean that they are conventional or social in the
way institutions which characterize particular societies are conventional. But it is
in the latter sense that Rawls is, or must be, thinking of practices, anyway so far as
his concept of the practice is to show how a utilitarian can, in ways consistent with
his position, justify the practice […] [W]hat might it mean to urge a reform of the
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practice of promising? In the Wittgensteinian use of “practice” that would be no
more, and no less sensible than urging a reform in the way we obey rules (not: a
particular mode of obedience to some particular rule), or in the way we point to
objects.15
18 There is a certain depth, a certain, let us say, inveterateness, to the relevant notion of a
practice, whereby it is intolerant to the idea of reform in a way that Rawls’s notion of a
practice seems not to accommodate. Rawls’s use of the analogy with games helps Cavell
make  the  point  palpable.  For  Rawls  compares  the  inadmissibility  of  rejecting  the
authority  of  the  rule  denying breaking promises  on utilitarian considerations  to  the
inadmissibility of rejecting the authority of the principle determining that three strikes
constitute striking out. But, Cavell points out, while it is comprehensible, and indeed one
could make a case for it, to think of the concept of striking out in baseball as allowing
four strikes, the concept of a promise cannot stand the corresponding revision.
19 But if this is right, what sense can we make Rawls’s suggestion that the practice may be
justified along utilitarian lines? Rawls says that the point of the practice of promising is
“to abdicate one’s title to act in accordance with utilitarian and prudential considerations
so that the future may be tied down and plans coordinated in advance” and adds that
“there are obvious utilitarian advantages” in having such a practice.16 But, so understood,
there is not much between promising and making any commitment whatsoever. Cavell
responds:  “Indeed there are [obvious advantages to the practice making promises,  so
understood]. Doesn’t one feel that they are too obvious? The very existence of human
society, and the coherence of one’s own conduct depend upon it […] [So understood],
promising is not an institution but the precondition of any institutions among persons at
all.”17
20 The ‘inveterateness’ of which I speak is developed in earlier parts of The Claim of Reason
through an exploration of Wittgenstein’s notion of a form of life. A major hindrance to a
proper understanding of this notion is a certain way of taking the idea of convention. In
trying to account for the “conventionality” of certain basic modes of response typical of
human beings we are tempted to understand them as the agreed upon arrangements a
particular culture has found convenient or beneficial to pursue because of conditions
particular to its history or environment. This way understanding the conventionality of
our practices seems to be present in Rawls’s various formulations, and it is clearly the
background when Rawls suggests that “there are obvious advantages in having a practice
[of promising].”18 Cavell, by contrast, proposes to think of conventions in that context
as those forms of life which are normal to any group of creatures we call human […]
Here the array of “conventions” are not patterns of life which differentiate human
beings  from one another  but  those  exigencies  of  conduct  and feeling  which all
humans  share.  Wittgenstein’s  discovery,  or  rediscovery,  is  of  the  depth  of
convention in human life, a discovery which insists on only of the conventionality
of human society but, we could say, on the conventionality of human nature itself.19
21 This is consequential to the way we should conceive of the constitutive move, because the
two ways of understanding convention set up differently one’s relation to the practice whose
rules one questions.  We can say that under Rawls’s  understanding there is  room for
someone giving or withholding consent to the practice itself, whereas in Cavell the moment
of consecration to a practice is dealt with in terms of initiation whose point is precisely to
problematize a straightforward notion of consent or agreement to a practice.
22 The primal moment where the question of the relation to the practice is taken up by
Cavell is his exploration of what he calls the Wittgensteinian scene of instruction. The scene
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is  threaded  throughout  the  Philosophical  Investigations,  revealing  an  anxiety  that  is
inherent  questioning  about  one’s  relation  to  one’s  practice,  precisely  because  one
recognizes  that  neither  justification  nor  identification  here  proceed  in  an  ordinary
manner. Cavell would agree with Rawls that one cannot appeal to the utilitarian principle
to justify breaking a promise since one thereby trumps the conditions of the very activity
one purports at the same time to be involved in. And, both Cavell and Rawls conceive of
the  moment  as  displaying  some  kind  of  incompetence.  But  while  in  Rawls  the
incompetence is related to the problematic of signing off on something one at the same
time disavows, in Cavell the inveterateness of the practice sheds new light on the kind of
incompetence at  stake:  it  is  a  lack of  mastery of  a deep and broad set of  capacities,
capacities that account for the possibility of proper maturation to human society.
23 This is what I meant when I said that Cavell’s criticism deepens constitutive move. Under
Cavell’s picture, we are implicated by the practice of promising in more fundamental and
incorrigible  a  way than Rawls’s  conception of  Practice  Rules  of  seems to  allow.  The
identification with the practice that figures in the constitutive move is not to be thought
of in terms of giving consent to,  or taking up of,  or entering into, a proposed set of
conventions; it is not to be thought of, that is, in terms of affirming a practice. Rather, the
inveterateness  of  the practice and the kind of  capacities  that  fund the possibility  of
partaking in it, imply that the problem of identification here is, let us say, a metaphysical
problem;  jeopardizing  these  practices  is  not  jeopardizing  something  with  which  we
identify.  These rules are not external  to us in the way that the rules of  this or that
chessboard game, this or that institution, are. Rather in questioning our identification
with these rules there is a sense in which we question our identity itself: “I am thrown back
upon myself, I as it were turn my palms outward, as if to exhibit the kind of creature I am,
and declare my ground occupied […]”20
24 Now, quite the contrary from trying to relativize or make more tolerant our view of these
practices, Cavell, precisely in appreciating their depth and the inalienable way in which
they implicate us, precisely, if you will, in emphasizing their rigidity, paves the way for a
proper charting out of the form of moral discussions. First, connecting the notion of a
practice to fundamental capacities acquired through initiation helps to see that moral
discussions proceed from, and assume as unproblematic, mastery of the relevant capacities
and identification with the rules:
It is perfectly true that in learning what a promise is we learn what defenses it is
appropriate or competent to enter, and where, should we not keep it. But these are
just the defenses we learn in learning to defend any of our conduct which comes to
grief:  those  excuses,  explanations,  justifications  (I  will  call  them,  as  a  whole,
elaboratives) which make up the bulk of moral defense.21
25 In discussing a case of breaking a promise, then, we are not going to focus on the defining
rules of the practice, but rather, taking them for granted concern ourselves with such
questions as
whether what you said was (tantamount to) a (serious) promise, whether you were
really  prevented from keeping it  (or  perhaps  only  succumbed to  temptation or
intimidation), whether, knowing what was likely to happen you ought to have made
it, whether you did what was possible to alleviate the consequences of the promise.
22
26 The point is a general one, and concerns a vitiation of the point and purpose of moral
conversation that Rawls’ focus on defining rules of a practice is prone to. The appeal to
rules as a response to a moral challenge amounts to, as the dynamics of the constitutive
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move reveals, silencing that challenge, showing that it cannot arise. And this makes it seem
as though in moral discussions we set each other straight, point out how the interlocutor,
incompetently, violated a rule unawares. But,
A  moral  reason  can  never  be  a  flat  answer  to  the  competent  demand  for
justification. If a moral question is competently raised then a moral response must
allow a discussion whose conclusion will be the fuller articulation of the position in
question […] One may, of course, refer to the rules of an institution in one’s defense;
the effect of that is to refuse to allow a moral question to be raised. And that is itself
a moral position, for which one must accept responsibility.23
27 Secondly, and analogously, the rigidity of Practice Rules – their peculiar intolerance to
violation – is flashed out in Rawls through the analogy with games. But,  precisely in
demonstrating this rigidity, there is demonstrated also the inadequacy of the Practice
Rules model to reflect the dynamics of moral discussions, specifically, the resolution of
moral conflict. For starters note that it is essential to games that what counts as a violation
of  the rules  will  be conclusively settled,  and games are set in such a way as to avoid
ambiguities and disagreements with respect to that. But there are no moral umpires, and,
as we have seen with promising, moral conversation is set in an evaluative key to the
resolution of, among other things, the question whether a rule was violated.
28 Furthermore, in games there is a clear cut demarcation of what must be done (what the
rules do not leave open for the player’s judgment) from what ought to be done (strategic
recommendations for playing the game well).  The principles for playing well  may be
codified as rules, narrowing down the alternatives, but this must be settled prior to the
game or else the game cannot be practiced. In morality, however, the demarcation of a
border between ‘playing’ and ‘playing well,’ the establishing of the balance between must
and ought,  is  precisely  the  starting  point  deliberation.  Moral  discussion starts  where  a
choice presents itself between two or more morally problematic actions. It is when my
‘must’ meets your ‘ought not’ that we begin deliberation. Obviously, I say, I would not
offend this poor man if I did not have to help my sister. Obviously, you say, you ought to
help your sister, but at the price of offending that man, you ought not to. Cavell points
out that the philosopher’s, in this case Rawls’s, dwelling on “You ought to do X” vs. “You
ought not to do X” obscures this mode of conversing. Moral discussions treat mastery of
Practice  Rules,  or  elaboratives,  as  given,  but  nonetheless  engage  the  details  of  the
situation at hand to flash out what the interlocutors take responsibility for, what their
positions are.
[U]nlike the case of games, what is and is not an alternative open to you is not fixed.
Actions are not moves, and courses of actions are not plays. What you say you must
(have  to,  are  compelled  to...)  do,  another  will  feel  you  ought  to  do,  generally
speaking, other things being equal, etc., but that here you ought (would do better)
not to... What you say you must do is not “defined by a practice,” for there is no
such practice until you make it one, make it yours. We might say, such a declaration
defines you, establishes your position.24
29 Appreciating how deeply ingrained Practice Rules are, how, in a sense, inalienable they
are, should help us locate better their role in ordinary moral discussions. When engaged
in moral conversation, we are not invoking a pre-inculcated set of conceptual relations,
institutional rules that then go on,  without our intervention as it  were,  to settle the
dispute. Rather, the complexity of moral life calls for the deliberation and assessment of
choices that are,  to use Cavell’s  term, elaboratively  loaded. Choices that call  for moral
discussion involve the entertainment of a whole host of Practice Rules. They are, as it
were, the building blocks of our discussion. The discussion concomitant to these loaded
Autonomy Here and Now
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
8
choices  makes  clear,  to  ourselves  and  others,  the  significance  for  us  of  the  various
considerations that bear on the choice, considerations the intelligibility of which can only
come to view for someone initiated into the use of elaboratives, someone who knows the
Practice Rules (what’s the value of keeping my word to mean to someone who knows not
what giving one’s  word is?)  Our choices manifest  the position we take  vis-a-vis  these
various considerations, and, more often than not, we respect one set of considerations at
the peril  of another.  But since we are responsible,  and are held responsible,  for such
choices, moral discussions are of the form of creating our practice. Finding where our musts
end and oughts begin is ours, rather than Practice Rules’, to do.
30 We  get  an  extremely  interesting  result:  Cavell’s  analysis  and  criticism  of  Rawls’s
constitutive  move  brings  to  the  fore  something  like  a  sublation  of  this  move.  The
constitutive move has the skeptic realizes that he attempts to reject a constitutive part of
a practice with which he identifies. Cavell, we have seen, puts pressure on the nature of
this identification through the exploration of the notion of convention that funds it.25 The
interesting result is that in pressing this idea of identification with a practice, resources
are revealed that allow Cavell to sharpen and lay bare the contours of moral life in such a
way  that  another  notion  of  identification  becomes  apparent.  This  new  notion  of
identification, albeit located at a level logically posterior to the one Rawls engages, is of
immediate practical significance: it pertains to the agent’s actual practical involvements.
Rather than in the way of a philosopher’s invoking a logically antecedent “convention”
(either  in  Rawls’s  or  Cavell’s  sense)  to  which  the  skeptic  is  supposedly  committed,
identification in this sublated sense arises when an interlocutor addresses a competent
challenge to an agent’s doing, goading him to assess, to determine his position from within
the very real details of his involvement in the case: the particular considerations the case
elicits provide the material for the delineation of a position he can live with, and bid the
interlocutor to respect.
31 See also that this notion of identification introduces two elements that are essential to
the act of taking responsibility, the act that gives moral discussion its shape, as it were:
confrontation and expression. Practical identification takes place amidst the elaboration of a
moral  position;  it  is  the  act  of  taking  responsibility  for  such  a  position.  As  such,
identification is as a task for which confronting another’s challenge is essential. At this
level, then, you cannot be your own judge because the very space in which judgment
unfolds is the space of elaboratives, of responses to an inquiry, to a competent challenge.
Assuming a position, taking responsibility, is an expressive task set and enabled by the
interlocutor whom you confront, a task that, at this level, might be called the task of
constitution of practical identity; for it is only in carrying it out that the content of a
morally loaded choice appears, here and now, as something to identify with. This brings
out one last important point. We can now see that, since to respond to a moral challenge
by deferring to Practice Rules is to essentially delegitimize the interlocutor, render him
incompetent, by responding in such a way we deprive ourselves of the conditions of moral
judgment. This point will be further developed in Cavell's criticism of TJ, to which I now
turn.
 
The Criticism of TJ
32 Already in the preface to Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome Cavell himself hints at the
possibility  of  linking  his  meta-ethical  excurses  in  the  third  part  of  The  Claim to  his
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lectures on Emersonian Moral Perfectionism, and particularly with the criticism against
moments in Rawls’s TJ.26 Emersonian Perfectionism is not offering a formulation of a
competing, perfectionist, principle of justice, nor challenges Rawls’s principles as they
stand.  Actually,  the  eschewal  of  codification,  which  is  a  key  feature  of  Moral
Perfectionism,  is  important  for  Cavell,  among  other  things,  precisely  for  keeping  in
critical conversation with theories of justice from either Teleological or Deontological
camps. Yet this very eschewal makes for a difficulty in pinpointing the level at which this
“outlook or dimension of thought”27 represents a viable criticism of these theories, and
even  raises  the  more  perturbing  question  as  to  whether  there  is  room  for  fruitful
conversation at all between the enterprises. I leave this philosophical question aside and,
convinced that there is, take my cue from the earlier meta-ethical criticism just surveyed.
33 Call democratic judgments the various forms of evaluation that citizens in societies of
“good enough justice”28 engage in with respect to their own conduct as members of such
societies  and  with  respect  to  the  form  and  conduct  of  their  society’s  institutions.
Understand a “society of good enough justice” to be a society like our own, a liberal
society  that,  while  not  yet  a  well  ordered  society  is  nevertheless  committed  to  the
furthering of assimilation and implementation of the principles of justice. Understand
also “conduct as members of such a society” to mean not only one’s conduct vis à vis the
institutions of  one’s  society but  rather,  taking into account the pervasiveness  of  the
political,  one’s  conduct  in  so  far  as  that  is  guided by  one’s  attempts  to  answer  the
question “how to live?” or how “to be useful in the world?”29 Democratic judgment in this
broad sense covers a wide territory indeed, from high flown and abstract engagement
with a legislative motions or constitutional chapters, to intimate explorations of career
choice or the fate of a marriage.
34 But now consider that our earlier reflections about the nature of moral conversation may
be pertinent to democratic judgments, in so far as the question of identification is raised
in these judgments in its highest pitch. And indeed Cavell thinks that actual judgments
about what to do in particular cases, judgments such as we discuss in ordinary moral
encounters,  are  essentially  linked  to  the  level  of  engagement  typical  of  democratic
judgment. Moral Perfectionism amplifies this level of engagement and investigates it, as
it were, as a topic all on its own:
Of course one will feel that in each case of moral conflict... persons are deciding
what kind of life they wish to lead, what kind of persons they mean to be. But that
is the point. One might say that in our remarriage comedies and in their derived
melodramas, this is all that is being decided, that our interest in these relatively
privileged couples is their pure enactment of the fact that in each moral decision of
our lives,  our  senses  of  ourselves,  and of  what,  and whom, we are  prepared to
consent to, are at stake. Emerson will put such an idea [saying]: “Character teaches
above our wills. Men imagine that they communicate their virtue and vice only by
overt actions, and do not see that virtue and vice emit a breath every moment.”30
35 This helps locate Cavell’s discomfort with TJ. In the early criticism Cavell tried to fend off
the tendency to have the foundationalist thrust of the constitutive move play a role in the
adumbration  of  the  nature  and  dynamics  of  moral  conversation.  In  TJ,  Rawls’s
accomplishment in flashing out the intelligibility of justice – in “mak[ing] perspicuous
how the justice of justice is to be assessed”31 – is given a definitive role in the portrayal of
the form of our commitments to one another as citizens of a democratic society.32 This, I
will  show,  results  in  a  Cavellian  criticism that  essentially  apes  the  structure  of  the
criticism in  The  Claim.  TJ  tries  for  a  delineation  of  the  limits  of  our  responsibilities
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according to a conception of justice whose resources fit the foundationalist animus of the
book. TJ’s depiction of the form of democratic judgment – a judgment that is, after all,
made  from  the  perspective  of  an  agent  deliberating  here  and  now  –  is  therefore
inescapably vitiated.
36 According to Rawls, a well ordered society is one that could originate by way of a fair
contract between the parties in the OP. In this procedure rational agents, conceived as
representatives of citizens in a liberal democratic society, select principles of justice to
regulate the basic structure of society. The principles and the form of a well ordered
society are thereby both derived and justified. Go back to Korsgaard’s characterization of
Rawls’s constructivism. The OP models the conditions of a problem that we, citizens of a
present and less than perfect liberal democratic society, face, namely, the problem of
distributive justice. Since this is our problem, and the OP models it, the solution arrived at
via this procedure is one we ought to accept. Now it is clear that the critical moment for a
constitutive move reading such as Korsgaard’s turns on the relation between our problem
and the way the OP models it. The question is whether we acknowledge the problem that
the OP models as our own, whether we identify with it, whether the OP retains the point
and purpose of our initial preoccupation.
37 It is important, in order to properly engage that question, to clearly distinguish between
our standpoint here and now as citizens of this society, and the standpoint of the agents
of construction,  inhabiting a well  ordered society, presumably a society (forever) not
(yet) our own. The OP is a mediating conception that serves to get us from conceptions
that we endorse – conceptions supposedly prevalent in our culture (as per the notion of
public reason) and implicit in our considered judgments (as per the notion of reflective
equilibrium) – namely, the conception of persons as free and equal and the conception of
society as a fair system of corporation over time, and towards the principles of justice as
they define a conception of a well ordered society. The challenge to Rawls’s theory, so far
as  Korsgaard’s  reading  of  the  constitutive  move  into  it  is  concerned,  lies then  in
accounting for the identification with those conceptions that provide the materials of
construction.
38 One problem from the quarters of identification could be this: in so far as the conceptions
of the moral person and of society as a fair cooperative system restrict parties in the OP
in ways which they themselves do not, upon reflection, approve of, the results of the
construction lose their legitimacy. I do not think, however, that this problem poses a
fundamental criticism to Rawls’s theory. Because TJ wants to get at principles that embody
autonomy  and  part  of  its  methodology  is  therefore  to  consider  such  criticisms,  if
successful,  as  like  extensions  of  its  own  enterprise.  Those  criticisms  are  not  only
welcome, they are invited. The OP and reflective equilibrium, and later on the idea of
public reason, all reflect a commitment to testing the identification at stake, to ensuring
that  the principles  do properly  represent  our  considered judgments.  Moreover,  TJ  is
working  out  the  suggested  principles,  considering them  against  other  alternatives,
having the various suggestions compete, so to speak. So criticisms about the content of
the principles merely suggest that TJ does not accomplish what it sets out to do, but
nothing about what it sets out to do and even the way it does it is threatened. The problem
is, merely, one of execution.
39 The identification problem as I understand Cavell to raise it is, however, one that survives
any perfecting of execution. In fact Cavell on many occasions professes both admiration
for Rawls’s accomplished and systematic execution, and agreement with the content of
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the principles. I want to ask how Rawls’s account is exposed to a problem with respect to
the possibility of viewing oneself as the source of the law, of identifying with the law – a
problem, call it, with his conception of what autonomy comes to in moral life – whatever
the final content of the principles of justice may turn out to be.  Put the question this way:
Suppose that the principles of justice do describe the content of our sense of justice, just
as the rules of the practice of promising properly describe the concept of promising. Is
there still a problem in what Rawls wants from his project, a problem akin to the problem I
have  explicated,  in  the  case  of  promising,  with  the  place  Rawls’s  constitutive  move
assumes in moral life? The content of the principles thus put aside, we might call such a
problem, after Cavell, a problem of relating to what we know.
40 Cavell acknowledges that a shift of critical focus from the content of the principles to, let
us say, the mode of entertaining them or relating to them in societies of good enough
justice, leaves one somewhat vulnerable to the charge of neglecting the more pressing
matters of political justice. Nevertheless, he insists on articulating a threat to democracy
originating not in the particular faults of this or that system of laws – which he is happy
to a admit is indeed a prior concern, even a condition to his own undertaking33 – but
rather a threat jeopardizing systems of rules as such, a danger originating not in the
content of the rules but in their form, in their nature as rules.
41 What is problematic in our relation to rules? Rousseau is clearly in the background here.
Consider from The Geneva Manuscript the suggestion that the will cannot be obligated, say,
“tied down in advance.” Autonomy seems to be here subject to a temporal requirement:
[…] it is contrary to the nature of will, which has no dominion over itself, to engage
itself for the future. One can obligate oneself to do, but not to will; and there is a
great  difference  between  executing  what  one  has  promised  because  one  has
promised it, and continuing to will it, even when one has not previously promised
to do so [You could call this the difference between consent and freedom] .34
42 In both promising and principles of justice we have taken the force of the constitutive
move to be somehow attributed to a logically prior act of identification. By describing the
case as one of promising, you demonstrate a commitment to the rules of the practice;
seeking to solve the problem of justice, where that problem is formulated in terms of the
conceptions of the moral person and of the well ordered society, you avow commitment
to the best solution to be found. But the identification befitting the foundationalist thrust
of the constitutive move is not located in a temporal space. This is because it addresses a
skeptical worry of a particular shape. In Cavell’s terms I would describe this shape as the
temptation to reject our criteria. The constitutive move is but the laying out for the
skeptic to see that his doubts are inconsistent with commitments he himself is prepared
to assume.  Yet  this  assumption,  both in the case of  the appeal  to the nature of  the
practice and in the case of the OP, represents a level of identification far removed from
the agent’s temporal situatedness, from the weave of cares and commitments pertinent to
a particular, temporally situated choice. I am not here assessing the satisfactoriness of
the constitutive move itself. All I am pointing out now is that since the skeptic does not
raise his question from any particular point in time, the answer he is given in principle
does not draw on resources pertaining to any particular temporal investment.
43 Democratic judgment is a form of evaluation governing our interactions as agents always
from a particular perspective, a circle of cares and commitments, a weave of attachments,
attractions, obligations and necessities. In so far as Rawls’ TJ aspires for the principles of
justice to inform those judgments he runs the risk of  neglecting to pay heed to the
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temporal  requirement  of  autonomy  Rousseau  insists  on.  This  is  because  the
foundationalist thrust that goes into the development of the principles keeps the level of
identification operative in the account divested of the agent’s particular determinations.
And, in so far as democratic judgments are an essential part of democratic life – in so far,
that is, that they are part of democracy’s inner workings – to misrepresent their form in
this way is to misrepresent the conditions of democracy. That is why Cavell’s criticism is
fundamental:  the  problem it  flashes  out,  no  amount  of  tinkering  can  mend since  it
concerns no particular detail of the theory. It is the theory’s application to democratic life
that is at stake. I want to say, it is the theory’s conception of itself as something to be applied
that is the problem. And for a theory that harbors practical aspirations and that enjoys
such success – I would say even, practical prestige – as A Theory of Justice does, a problem
here is not to be over-looked.
44 To start assessing Cavell’s discomfort let us call up a place in TJ where Rawls clarifies, by
way  of  “intuitive  considerations,”35 the  sense  in  which  the  difference  principle  is
egalitarian.  To do so,  Rawls attempts to flash out the way the difference principle is
compatible with the principle of redress. While the difference principle does not adjure
the eradication of undeserved inequalities – like “the distribution of natural talents and
the contingencies of social circumstance” – it does command that we use the resources
pooled from these inescapable contingencies in such a way that the fortunate “gain from
their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.”36
Thus, to my mind in one of the most exhilarating passages, Rawls goes on to offer a
rebuttal  of  the  thought  that  the  impossibility  of  perfect  redress  excuses  ignoring
injustice, “as if the refusal to acquiesce in injustice is on a par with being unable to accept
death”:37
the natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that people are
born society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. The basic
structure of [Aristocratic and cast] societies incorporates the arbitrariness found in
nature.  But  there  is  no  necessity  for  men  to  resign  themselves  to  these
contingencies.  The  social  system  is  not  an  unchangeable  order  beyond  human
control but a pattern of human action. In justice as fairness men agree to share one
another’s fate. In designing institutions they undertake to avail themselves of the
accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the common
benefit  […]  and while  no doubt  imperfect  in  other  ways,  the institutions which
satisfy [the two] principles are just.38
45 Now I do not purport to object to the content of Rawls’s reply. I am interested in the role
given the words “men agree to share one another’s fate,” a phrase Cavell picks up on to
interpret  the  book’s  practical  ambitions.  Notice  the  kind  of  muddle  affecting  the
embittered  egalitarian.  His  intolerance  to  inequality  renders  him  inapt  to  properly
distinguish the limits  of  our responsibilities:  he considers  things that  are out  of  our
hands, hard inescapable natural facts, unjust. Rawls sets him straight. Our agreement to
share each other’s fate is invoked to make the embittered egalitarian re-appreciate the
boundaries of the dominion of justice, to have him see what is ours to mend and what is
ours to bear. Cavell recognizes a tone of “elegaicism”39 running through the book. I take
this  paragraph  to  be  representative  of  such  a  tone.  Note  the  conclusiveness  of  our
impotence, the hard facticity of nature that sets the limits to what fits our hands. And
then the sharing of the coping with what the inescapable conditions of human existence
have left us with, and the suggestion that the principles of justice exhaust what there is to
do with what is thus left, and the sense of sublimated pride that goes into bearing this
forlorn recognition.
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46 What  is  useful  to  me here  appears  not  a  paragraph later,  when Rawls  considers  an
objection  to  the  effect  that  “those  better  situated  deserve  their  greater  advantages
whether  or  not  they are to  the benefit  of  others.”40 To answer that  objection Rawls
invokes a distinction between the level of the choice of the principles of justice – that is
the level of his response to the embittered egalitarian – and the level of implementing
those principles in an already just society. What I want you to gain a sense of, and in that
way help bring out what is for Cavell the brunt of the problem, is the way the finality of
the demarcation of our responsibilities which we gauged in the former level, trickles down
to the latter:
It is perfectly true that given a just system of cooperation as a scheme of public
rules and the expectations set up by it, those who, with the prospect of improving
their  condition,  have  done  what  the  system  announces  that  it  will  reward  are
entitled to their advantages. In this sense the more fortunate have a claim to their
better  situation;  their  claims  are  legitimate  expectations  established  by  social
institutions, and the community is obligated to meet them. But this sense of desert
presupposes the existence of a cooperative scheme; it is irrelevant to the question
of whether in the first place the scheme is to be designed in accordance with the
difference principle or some other criterion.41
47 Again, I do not object here to what Rawls says. Of course the distinction is valid and the
notions of legitimacy, claims upon and obligations of a community, and entitlement to
deserts play such role as Rawls describes. I want, rather, following Cavell, to question
Rawls’s  picture  of  the  interaction  between  the  levels.  What  does  Rawls  mean  by
“presupposes”  in  “this  sense  of  desert  presupposes  the  existence  of  a  cooperative
scheme”? What becomes of our “agreement to share one another’s fate” at the level of
living with our institutions and with one another rather than designing the institutions
and  laws?  Grant  that  our  claims,  entitlements  and  obligations  in  the  second  level
presuppose this first level agreement. Is this to mean that securing identification with the
first level design amounts to doing all that we can, all that fits our hands, in justice? What
is the form of a challenge to the application of the principles? Grant that the embittered
egalitarian is  confused about  the  limits  of  our  responsibilities  at  the  first  level.  Are
challenges arising from the second level of the form of such muddle as well? Recall the
four  strikes  example.  There,  it  is  only  at  the  level  of  instituting  the  practice  that
considerations of utility are of use. If we think of the agreement to share our life together
as governing standards of justice, like in the example the principle of utility governs
standards for the practice of baseball, are we then to conclude that, in the same way
appeal to the governing principle is debarred once the practice is instantiated in the case
of games, it is likewise debarred in the case of justice? What then can we appeal to?
48 Cavell identifies this ‘trickling down’ to be present in various moments of expression in TJ,
moments covering both dimensions of the democratic judgment – the appraisal of the
conduct and form of society and of one another. In these moments of expression the OP
and its consents are made pertinent to our responsibilities here and now, forming the
book’s  conception  of  what  Cavell  dubs  “The  Conversation  of  Justice.”42 Such  is,  for
example, the moment of responding (“there are many things to say”43) to someone failing
to see a reason to abide by their moral sentiments, sentiments of, after all, psychological
origins. Or, a yet more fundamental moment, where at stake is the public acceptance of
the principles, and the sense in which members of society may be said to be autonomous
and its scheme voluntary (“whenever social institutions satisfy [the principles of justice]
those engaged in them can say to one another that they are cooperating on terms to
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which they all would agree if they were free and equal persons whose relations with
respect to one another were fair”44).
49 Let us focus on a moment of expression where at stake is the assessment of each other’s
conduct in the broad sense characteristic of (one aspect of) the democratic judgment. The
trickling down is manifest, according to Cavell, when Rawls discusses a rational person’s
“plan of life”:
A rational  person may regret  his  pursuing a  subjectively  rational  plan,  but  not
because he thinks his choice is in any way open to criticism. For he does what seems
best at the time, and if his beliefs later prove to be mistaken with untoward results,
it is through no fault of his own. There is no cause for self reproach.45
50 Formulated in a normative key this reads:
[A] rational individual is always to act so that he needs never blame himself no
matter how his plans finally work out […] [He] can say that at each moment of his
life he has done what the balance of reasons required, or at least permitted.46
51 Admittedly, the chapter on “Deliberative Rationality,” where this quote is extracted from,
pertains  to  highly  abstract  features  of  rationality  and  does  not  specifically  address
decisions in a moral key. Yet the fact that those principles are to govern the choosing of a
plan of life, means that they pervade considerations typical of democratic judgment.47
Furthermore,  Rawls  refers  to  texts  by  Thomas  Nagel  and  Charles  Fried,  and  the
discussions there do involve the moral aspect of life plan considerations. Moreover still,
consider the comparison Rawls makes between the guiding principle of a plan of life and
the principle of right:
the principle of responsibility to self resembles a principle of right: the claims of
the self at different times are to be so adjusted that the self at each time can affirm
the plan that has been and is being followed. The person at one time, so to speak,
must not be able to complain about actions of the person at another time.48
52 The principle of deliberative rationality is important for Cavell because it makes manifest
TJ’s conception of moments of expression: they are similar in form to the incompetence
response, the deference to Practice Rules, that we have encountered “Two Concepts of
Rules.” In that, so Cavell, the conception represents a rejection of Moral Perfectionism.
Understanding Emersonian Perfectionism as an interpretation of Rousseau’s and
Kant’s idea of freedom as autonomy means understanding it as questioning what or
who the self is that commands and obeys itself and what an obedience consists in
that is inseparable from mastery. Rousseau’s criticism of society in these terms is
that we are not expressed in the laws we give ourselves, that the public does not
exist,  that the social  will  is  partial  (conspiratorial). Kant […] [asks] whether our
obedience  is  partial,  that  is  heteronomous,  taken on the  part  of  incentives  not
internal  to the law.  Emerson’s  turn is  to make my partiality  itself  the sign and
incentive of my siding with the next or further self, which means siding against my
attained perfection (or conformity),  sidings which require the recognition of  an
other – the acknowledgment of a relationship – in which this sign is manifest.49
53 What pains Cavell in the Rawlsian conversation of justice is a form of expression which
defers to a moment of identification far removed from the agent’s concerns here and
now. We have already observed the role this moment plays in the constitutive move, the
role it plays in rebutting a certain kind of skeptic. And we have also seen that the worries
and considerations characteristic of ordinary moral conversation are of a different sort
than those of the skeptic, and that hence a different way to conceive of identification is
appropriate in the relevant logical level. Now I do not think, here too, that Cavell suggests
that there is anything wrong with the grounding TJ offers to the principles of justice. His
Autonomy Here and Now
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
15
concern is with the way the OP is open to the present, to the conversation of justice going
on  here  and  now;  his  concern,  that  is,  is  with  the  way  the  foundationalist animus
appropriate to the ‘first  level’  –  the level  where we meet challenges like that of  the
embittered egalitarian – keeps functioning after, as it were, the skeptics typical of that
level have been silenced.
54 Both the “above reproach” passage and the “two senses of desert” passage suggest that
Rawls thinks of this opening to the present through the notion of legitimacy. And there
are  two  main  difficulties  with  putting  that  notion  to  work  in  the  context  of  the
conversation of  justice,  difficulties that touch the heart of  what Cavell  wants from a
conception of autonomy subject to a temporal requirement. First, there is the vitiation of
the form of democratic judgment. Cavell says:
When the  conversation of  justice  is  directed  to  the  constitution  of  the  original
position […] [it] comes to an end in a state of reflective equilibrium. To prove that
[…] there is an optimal resolution to this conversation (a set of principles whose
choice will receive optimal agreement) is one of Rawls’s notable achievements […] It
seems to me that Rawls is taking encouragement from the proof concerning the
resolution  for  the  original  position,  to  regard  “above  reproach”  as  a  rational
response to the question of affirming a plan of life in our actual society. Whereas
this bottom line is not a response but a refusal of further conversation.50
55 Granted, the conversation ends, but why is it not a response? The problem is that to
conceive of questions directed at one’s plan of life in terms of legitimacy is to focus, so to
speak, on the wrong part of the judgment:
It is, I surmise, because a moral judgment of a state of affairs (not [yet] issuing in a
judgment as to the action imperative in the face of  this state) has a perceptual
dimension  and  assesses  pleasure  and  pain,  and  because  it  is  informed  by
sensibilities  in  various  stages  of  perceptiveness  or  impressionability,  that  moral
judgment is sometimes held to have an aesthetic dimension. Perfectionists, judging
the world and themselves in it,  may seem to dwell in this dimension. Rawls has
shown  why  this  dimension  must  not  affect  the  moral  necessity  of  reflective
equilibrium (the fact of matching between judgments and principles) expressed in
the joint choice in the original position of the principles of justice. But this should
not compromise the moral necessity of reflective judgment (the demand for and
exposure  to,  the  matching  of  one’s  judgment  by  the  judgment  of  others)  in
measuring  the  degree  of  one’s  life’s,  hence  of  one’s  society,  departures  from
compliance with those principles.51
56 The invocation of Kant’s idea of reflective judgment is meant, I take it, to mark a shift of
emphasis similar to the one we have marked moving from an account grounding the
authority of the rules of a practice to an account of the mode of discussion that morality
is. The assessments of one’s life plan treat the principles of justice like the assessment of
the  worthiness  of  an  act  treats  the  central  concepts  of  our  moral  economy.  When
thinking about what we do when we assess the compliance of our life plan with those
principles, Cavell points out, we should wear the notion of legitimacy. This is because it
makes us conceive of  the subject  matter of  assessment,  the life  plan (or the act),  as
already clearly articulated, ready for determination under the principles or concepts in
our possession, which themselves are without difficulty culled. It is a picture of simple
application. The skeptic that questions the authority of the practice haunts us and so we
problematize what in these assessments is unproblematic and thereby thwart their form.
Just like the notion of position was invoked to alert us to the different kind of evaluation
at  stake,  so  is  the  notion  of  reflective  judgment  invoked  now.  “Above  reproach”
represents  precisely  the  kind  of  response  that  stifles  the  nature  of  this  mode  of
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conversation,  the  kind  that  the  appeal  to  Practice Rules  represented  in  the  case  of
ordinary moral conversation. Cavell indeed calls up the analogy with games to make his
point here, too:
My criticism of the analogy was that no rule can function in the moral life as the
three strikes rule functions in its game. One who asks for four strikes in a game of
baseball is incompetent at the game and can perhaps be taught what it is. In the
moral life the equivalent finality is carried not by a rule but by a judgment of moral
finality, one that may be competently opposed, whose content may then enter into
moral  argument,  one  whose  resolution  is  not  to  be  settled  by  appeal  to  a  rule
defining institution; a judgment, hence, that carries consequences unforeseen or
forsworn in games.52
57 What is crucial for my purposes here is the thought that in holding fast to the notion of
legitimacy, in failing to judge democratically, we manifest a failure of autonomy as well.
This is exemplified through the examination of an extreme example – Nora in Ibsen’s A
Doll’s House. Her rebuke induces Torvald to respond in a manner similar to what we hear
in Rawls’s “above reproach” – an appeal to rules that takes them to carry a finality that
precisely  replaces  the  work  of  judgment  that  Nora  seeks.  Cavell  thinks  Torvald’s
response,  beyond  (and  because  of)  the  fact  that  it  serves  to  delegitimize,  make
incompetent, Nora’s challenge, betrays moral incompetence on Torvald’s part:
Torvald’s judgment,  “You’re talking like a child” is of Nora’s incompetence as a
moral agent; his judgment condemns him while the legal rules are perhaps on his
side... Torvald’s road back begins […] in recognizing his former valuing of Nora was
not based on his judging for himself, and bearing responsiveness to his judgment,
but on the imagination of rules that, as it were, replaced his judgment. (As rules do
[…] in games. This is something that allows games to be practiced and played,  their
intentions to be shaped, their consequences to be confined, scored. The limits of
responsiveness are known – contract like – in advance).”53
58 It is here that we see most clearly how Rawls’s understanding of the conversation of
justice in terms of legitimacy runs counter to what Moral Perfectionism wants from it.
The  problematic  of  conformity,  embodying  the  threat  to  democracy  Emersonian
Perfectionism is most interested to combat, is not only left untreated in the Rawlsian
account, but there is a current in that account which actually promotes it. What we find
here  is  that,  so  to  speak,  autonomy is  not  enough.  Or,  if  you will,  that  you can be
autonomous in one sense without being autonomous in another. Presumably the laws
embody Torvald’s identification in the way Rawls’s account of the OP wants them to. In
that  sense  Torvald  can  be  said  to  be  autonomous.  In  that  sense,  as  well,  since  the
constitutive move goes through for both Torvald and Nora, legitimacy may be invoked,
Torvald  is  not  wrong  to  invoke  it.  But  in  another  sense  autonomy is  precisely  what
Torvald’s response lacks.
59 It  is  against  the backdrop of  the perfectionist  call  for  understanding autonomy in a
temporal key that we should hear Cavell’s early, seemingly superficial, criticism of the
appeal to rules:
If my remarks […] are right, then a suggestion emerges about why philosophers
appeal  to  rules  in  theorizing  about  morality,  and  about  how  rules  are  then
conceived. The appeal is an attempt to explain why such an action as promising is
binding upon us. But if you need an explanation for that, if there is any sense that
something more than personal commitment is necessary, then the appeal to rules
comes too late.54
Autonomy Here and Now
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
17
60 If my explorations are on the right track, then there is a reading of these lines whereby
what is being criticized here is not the constitutive move itself, not the attempt to show
the normativity of the laws per se, but rather the tendency to have that move overstep its
bounds,  play  itself  out  at  a  level  where  normativity  is  to  be  unpacked  in  terms  of
“personal  commitment.”  The  democratic  judgment  invokes  the  agent’s  identification
here and now, with respect to the particulars of his life plan, its specific motivations and
attractions; the compromises and sacrifices considered; the managing of constraints, and
the reactions to unexpected turns of events; the irreversible consequences, already felt
and not yet arrived at, etc. The outlay of one’s cares and commitments cannot be flashed
out, hence cannot be endorsed, identified with, besides thus entertaining the substantive
details  of  one’s  determinations,  an  exploration  of  considerations  in  light  of  the
complexity that surrounds such determinations. And the crux of the matter for Cavell is
that  this  sort  of  exploration,  because  of  its  “aesthetic  dimension”55 –  the  essential
evaluative  component  inseparable  from  such  issues  –  essentially  proceeds  from  a
recognition of partiality by way of conversation among peers.56
61 Interestingly,  this  result  with respect  to identification rehearses the sublation of  the
constitutive move we have encountered with respect to the concept of practice. Cavell
says: “the question of whether morality has its foundation in reason is given the following
slant  of  answer  in  Emerson:  perfectionism  has  its  foundation  in  rethinking.”57 The
ingenuity  of  Emersonian  Perfectionism  lies  in  the  insight  that  concrete  moral  self
legislation, as taking place always in the present and from its complex and sensitivity
laden perspective, both issues from and utilizes a state in which we find ourselves and
with which we are somehow dissatisfied, a state Cavell calls the “attained state of the
self”58 (or society, as I promptly discuss). The fact that the possibility of autonomy thus
presupposes the recognition of partiality, suggests that the occasion of self legislation
contains an irreducible element of criticism, and hence an essential public register, a
concrete role for the other, figured as a friend. For a critical examination of the sort
democratic judgment calls for there has to be a challenge to one’s determinations as they
stand,  a  shaming  awakening  to  a  shortcoming  of  one’s  “attained  self,”  of  one’s
sensibilities as they cope, have unto now coped, with the complexity of this expansive
evaluative task. This kingdom of ends is entered into in companionship; here and now
autonomy is a task that cannot be accomplished alone.
62 I have limited the discussion up to now only to one aspect of the democratic judgment,
namely, where it is concerned with evaluating one’s conduct or plan of life. But in that I
never registered the way Moral Perfectionism conceives the two aspects of the judgment
– that of evaluating one’s self and that of evaluating one’s society – to be interwoven. For
Cavell, “[M]easuring the degree of one’s society’s distance from strict compliance with
the principles of justice is a function of taking the measure of one’s sense of compromise
with injustice or rather with imperfect justice in one's life within actual institutions.”59
Thus all I have said about the shape of the judgment of a life plan equally applies to the
shape of the assessment of the departure of the institutions of one’s society from the
ideal. Cavell likes to refer to this aspect of the judgment as the moment where justice
“takes up its sword.”60 It is the moment where conclusions from the ideal part of the
theory make claims on our society, a society less than well ordered. Rawls says that in
non ideal cases “our judgment is guided by the priority indicated by the lexical ordering
[of the principles].” Still recognizing the abstract nature of the principles he says:
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Thus  as  far  as  circumstances  permit,  we  have  a  natural  duty  to  remove  any
injustices,  beginning  with  the  most  grievous  as  identified  by  the  extent  of  the
deviation from perfect justice. Of course, this idea is extremely rough. The measure
of departures from the ideal is left importantly to intuition.61
63 Cavell takes issue with this phrasing from Rawls most of all. He asks “What else is left?”
Not only is there the impression formed that not much is left, but the very suggestion
that measuring is left – now that the foundationalist work of setting the principles is done
– suggest the very permeating of foundationalist thrust into the here and now. The lack
of stipulation of the way this measuring is supposed to go suggests that Rawls is thinking
of intuition here along lines similar to those offered when intuition assumed significant
role at the most crucial foundationalist local of the book, namely, the process of reflective
equilibrium. The idea at play there is that our considered judgments, intuitively made,
are both checked by and provide a test for the principles the theory offers. Cavell worries
that in leaving democratic judgment “importantly to intuition,” there is “concealed the
assumption, or picture, or premiss, that intuition can only be checked, or rationalized, or
brought into reflective equilibrium, by principles.”62 Invoking the model  of  reflective
judgment once more, Cavell then reiterates the kind of vitiation democratic judgment is
subject  to,  illicitly  inheriting  as  it  does  features  originating  in  a  project
foundationalistically oriented:
[T]he  matching  of  principles  with  considered judgments  yielding  reflective
equilibrium does not describe the process of bringing a present perception (say, of
constitution of intolerable inequality or discrimination) under what Kant describes
in  the  Critique  of  Judgment  as  reflective  judgment  […]  In  arriving  at  reflective
equilibrium  the  picture  is  that  judgment  finds  its derivation  in  a  principle,
something  more  universal,  rational,  objective,  say  a  standard,  from  which  it
achieves justification or grounding […] In reflective judgment, rather, the idea is of
the expression of a conviction whose grounding remains subjective – say myself –
but which expects or claims justification from the (universal) concurrence of other
subjectivities, on reflection; call this the acknowledgment of matching.63
64 The work of grounding is not annulled when moving to the level of practice. What Cavell
wants us to recognize, though, is that the structure of justification when assuming the
perspective of the present, when measuring departure from the ideal, is different than
that fitting the work of establishing the ideal. Grounding, here and now, is sublated.
65 The vitiation of the form of judgment as it pertains estimating society’s departure from
the ideal raises the issue of consent to or identification with society.  For the idea of
consent as it is offered in TJ goes only so far as identifying with the principles of justice is
concerned. Rawls’s carrying social contract theory’s conception of justice to a “higher
level  of  abstraction”64 manages to avoid the violent moment that preoccupied classic
contract  theories,  the moment where actual  society makes one party to injustices of
which one does not approve. The price to pay, however, is that, despite the fact that the
account proceeds from conceptions originating in actual society, consent is hedged – it is
limited to the principles these conceptions ground, and so it is left, in the final account,
removed from actual society. This is yet another form of putting the basic thought this
paper  wishes  to  track,  namely,  that  in  pushing  identification  to  the  level  of  the
constitution of the practice, one is liable to misconstrue the relation between that level
and the level of engaging the practice. For if identification is taken care of at a level
preceding actual  participation in the life  of  society,  one comes to think that  merely
following society’s “kosher” rules, assuming they are that, already embodies all there is
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to ask from autonomy. And, more to the present concern, one might think of assessing
one’s society as the measuring of its departure from what one has given one’s consent to.
66 But first, this is not the right way to picture consent, because it pays no tribute to the fact
that we are members of the society we assess:
The idea of directing consent to the principles […] seems to lead to an effort to
imagine confining or proportioning our consent – to imagine that […] the contract
might specify how far I may reduce my consent (in scope or degree) as justice is
reduced (legislatively or judicially). But my intuition is that my consent is not thus
modifiable or proportionable (psychological exile is not exile) […] it reaches into
every corner of society’s failure or ugliness. Between a society approaching strict
compliance  with  the  principles  of  justice  and  one  approaching  causes  of  civil
disobedience,  there  is  the  ground on which  existent  constitutional  democracies
circumscribe  everyday  lives  […] Consent  to  society  is  neither  unrestricted  nor
restricted; its content is part of the conversation of justice.65
67 Secondly, in a democratic judgment that assesses one’s society, it is precisely by having
that  picture  of  “proportionable”  consent  that  an  “above  reproach”  like  response,  a
response stifling the conversation of justice, is encouraged. A response such as this we
find in a moment of expression in Rawls’s discussion of envy. Rawls attempts to isolate a
moral  component  sometimes  accompanying  envy,  namely,  resentment.  Resentment
arises when we attribute the good fortune of others to some injustice. Therefore, Rawls
thinks,  “Those  who  express  resentment  must  be  prepared  to  show  why  certain
institutions  are  unjust  or  how  others  have  injured  them.”66 This  means  that  Rawls
continues  to  conceive  of  the  pertinent  moments  of  expression  as  continuing  the
foundationalist work, albeit now utilizing certain evidence from personal grievance to
help the task. And so when no constructive evidence of the sort is brought up, when pain
is  voiced  but  a  finger  is  not,  or  not  firmly,  pointed,  society  can  claim to  be  above
reproach, discussion cannot even begin. And this is the problem. It is not exactly that
society is not above reproach in those cases. Rather, what bothers Cavell is what we are
imagining these moments of expression to look like. Just like my saying that I am above
reproach to someone who challenges my conduct or life plan was shown to stifle the kind
of expressive work essential for my autonomy (in a temporal key), so too my demanding
that someone shows what laws or institutions are inconsistent with the principles of
justice stifles the expression of my consent to my society, offends the possibility of my 
identification with my society – rather than its principles. To ask to point to injustice of
laws  and  institutions  is  to  immediately  defer  the  complaint  raised  from within  the
practice to the level of the constitution of the practice. It is to deal with the complaint
through the notion of legitimacy. But determining the legitimacy of laws and institutions
is not what these moments of expression are about. It is again in immerging oneself in an
exploration of the sources of the other’s complaint, the other’s pain, and offering your
response to them, one by one, one on one, that one manages to give consent to society, to
truly become its member.
68 Cavell contests Rawls’s dismissal of envy unaccompanied by specific claim of injustice by
suggesting  an  analysis  of  pictures  of  “envious”  confrontation  as  they  appear  in  the
comedies of remarriage. Confrontation, conversation, of this sort is shown to contribute
to the felicity of democracy by way of making room for consent to a state of society
implicated  in  injustice  that  is  not  surveyed  by  society’s  rules  or  the  form  of  its
institutions.
How I respond […] to your […] resentment and indignation is fateful to what I want
of my society, to its democratic aspirations. To say something to the effect that “I
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am above reproach” is to end my relation with this other, and to that extent injure
the texture of my society […]
[In the comedies of remarriage] the [couple’s] responsiveness to others, on which
the films insist, means that their response to a charge of unbearable discrepancy
between their position and those of the mass of society would, in effect, be to take it
seriously, which means to consider that the charge comes from a competent agent,
one who know the rules of their shared institutions as well as they do. It means,
consequently, to let the questioning of their fortune cause them to ask whether
they wish to confirm their consent to a society in which their favored position has
depended, however much they feel they have earned or deserved it, too much on
their social connections, on their genetic and developed powers of quickness and
charm, and on luck. So they are forced to become conscious, as it were to taste the
fact, that their society is in some measure at best in partial compliance with the
principles of justice […] [T]hey will  all,  out of different perspectives in different
cases,  affirm  their  consent  to  their  society  […]  But  now  they  consent  in  the
consciousness  that  their  society’s  partiality  compromises  them  in  relation  to
justice, implicates them in some measure of injustice […].67
 
Conclusion
69 While  expatiating the Kantian interpretation to  TJ  Rawls  says  that  “to express  one’s
nature as a being of a particular kind is to act on the principles that would be chosen if
this nature were the decisive determining element.”68 But this gives the impression, as I
guess  dates  back  to  Kant,  that  acting  on  principles  is  a  matter  of  unproblematic
application of them to an already clearly articulated conception of the situation. And
already with respect to Kant Cavell says:
What is the maxim of your action now, that is, what are you doing and why are you
doing it? Are you sitting quietly in a classroom or studying philosophy or satisfying
a requirement or testing whether your interest  in literature or theology cab be
taken where it wants to go without a detour into philosophy, and are you doing any
of these things,  and countless others,  out of self  love, or self  punishment,  or to
please your parents, or to delay a career in the law, or to win a bet, or out of sheer
joy?  This  indefiniteness  in  the  description of  an  action alerts  us  to  the  task  of
locating Kant's apparent ease in selecting a maxim […] [in Kant] a person is pictured
as being stopped from acting by asking himself a question, namely whether the maxim
can be universalized, willed as a universal law.69
70 Thus Kant’s picture of the prohibitive role of the Categorical Imperative presents us with
a person already impressed by a sense of transgression, say temptation, which induces
the testing of the maxim. But this suggests that the description and sources of one’s
action, here and now, are laid bare to the one testing them, and it was this, we saw, that
Cavell attempted to criticize saying that “rules come too late.” It is when the rules (of the
categorical imperative, or of justice, or of the practice of promising) are conceived in such
a way as to exempt you of the responsibility to articulate your position, articulate what is
that you, here and now, are taking responsibility for, that we find that autonomy in Kant’s
sense becomes the enemy of autonomy, say, in Emerson’s and Rousseau’s sense.
71 Cavell thinks that Rawls’s handling of the moments of expression in TJ makes expressing
one’s nature by “acting on the principles that would be chosen if this nature were the
decisive element” take over – replace, Cavell says – expressing one’s nature, to borrow
from Rousseau, as a being against nature. That is, whereas the task of constitution of the
practice is met in such a way that the content of the rules expresses our nature as free
and equal, there is still the question of how acting on those principles is to be construed,
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how freedom is to be exercised. And Rawls is “encouraged” by the way the constitutive
move resolves skeptical quandaries, silences the skeptic, at the foundational level, to a
similar  form of  response  to  challenges  raised at  the  practical  level,  the  level  of  the
democratic judgment. However, 
An early lesson of democracy is  that one is not to legislate his or her tastes or
opinions, but only the good of all […] this early lesson is not just one among the
lessons  of  a  democracy:  any  may  have  to  bear  the  burden  of  showing  that  a
certainty  of  moral  position  may  be  based  merely  on  taste  or  opinion  –  not
inevitably, but in a given case. A philosopher will naturally think that the other has
to be argued from his position, which is apt to seem hopeless. But suppose the issue
is not to win an argument but to manifest for the other another way. The trial may
end soon,  your spade turned.  But  that  is  not,  for  perfectionism, the end of  the
confrontation, since its point was not argument. (let’s hope there’s no law against
your cultivating with your spade just there). It becomes the perfectionist moment,
where one begins showing how to manage individuation, its economy, the power
that  goes  into  passiveness  […]  In  a  democracy  the  speaking  of  public  thoughts
seems, in its open possibility, the easiest way to speak. For Emerson it is the most
necessary and the hardest. The distinction between private and public, subjective
and objective, a feast for metaphysical and moral dispute, becomes the daily fare of
democracy.70
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NOTES
1. Korsgaard goes further, actually. She says: “But the importance of the [constitutive move] is
deeper than that, for I believe – and I know this is more controversial – that the only way to
establish the authority of any purported normative principle is to establish that it is constitutive
of something to which the person whom it governs is committed – something that she either is
doing or has to do” (Korsgaard 2009: 57).
2. Korsgaard (2008: 322).
3. Another  objection  rebutted  is  the  objection  that  utilitarianism may end up justifying  the
punishing of the innocent. Cavell actually addresses both of Rawls’s rebuttals in tandem in his
criticism. See CR 293-303.
4. Rawls (1955: 16).
5. Rawls (1955: 22).
6. Rawls (1955: 24).
7. Rawls (1955: 25).
8. Kant (1997: 24).
9. Rawls (1955: 24).
10. Mulhall 1997.





16. Rawls (1955: 16).
17. CR 298.
18. As when he says: “In a practice there are rules setting up offices, specifying certain forms of
action appropriate to various offices, establishing penalties for the breach of rules, and so on. We
may think of the rules of a practice as defining offices, moves, and offenses” (“Two Concepts of
Rules,” 25). It is worth mentioning that this conception of the conventionality of the practice of







25. It  is worth mentioning that the rejection of Practice Rules of the sort that govern moral
discourse, or moral criteria, receives treatment in quite a different philosophical trajectory in
the fourth part of the Claim of Reason, through a philosophical diagnosis of skepticism of other
minds. It seems to me that this extremely difficult and obscure part of the book is owed much
more attention than it has received. Not the least of reasons is that it raises a connection, not yet
sufficiently  explored,  between  foundationalist  aspirations  in  morality  and  a  Wittgensteinian
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31. CHU 25. It does so by providing “tests of institutions according to the ability to mitigate [the]
burdens of both natural and social orders.”
32. Another criticism focusing on this issue, albeit in a different register, still also anchored in
the test case of promising, is found in Thompson 2004.
33. CHU xx.














47. In Cities of Words Cavell elucidates: “I suppose [Rawls means one need not blame oneself] for
such decisions  as  having made what  turns  out  to  be  a  bad investment,  or  having refused a
particular  offer  of  marriage,  or  not  having had children,  or  having taken a job that  seemed
lucrative instead of staying in school, and so on” (CW 177).
48. TJ 423 (my italics).
49. CHU 31.
50. CHU xxv.




55. See CHU xxvi-ii.








64. TJ 3, 11.
65. CHU 107-8.
66. TJ 533.
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ABSTRACTS
The paper links Cavell's early criticism of Rawls's “Two Concepts of Rules” to the later criticism
of TJ. In his early paper, Rawls enacts a certain type of foundationalist response to the practical
skeptic, commonly referred to nowadays as the constitutive move. While sympathetic to the move
itself, Cavell's criticism targets a conception of the nature of moral discussion that arises when
the move is as it were read into ordinary moral encounters. Cavell's later criticism rehearses the
structure of its precursor. In TJ, the conversation of justice takes the shape of seeking legitimacy,
aiming at a level where the limits of our responsibility are predetermined and clearly marked.
But this shape stifles the possibility of the kind of conversation whose point is to assess, here and
now,  what  our  identification  with  our  society  amounts  to  and what  the  significance  of  the
choices  we  make  as  members  of  this  society  exactly  is.  Having  the  structure  of  the  earlier
criticism in view furthers the understanding of Emersonian Moral Perfectionism, and sheds light
on some of its enigmatic features, such as the relevance of Kant's notion of reflective judgment to
moral thinking and the essentiality of the friend to perfectionist assent.
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